Tuttle v. Raymond: An Excessive Restriction upon Punitive Damages Awards in Motor Vehicle Tort Cases Involving Reckless Conduct by Williams, Gregory A.
Notes
Tuttle v. Raymond: An Excessive Restriction upon
Punitive Damages Awards in Motor Vehicle Tort Cases
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Tuttle v. Raymond,' the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine set out to reexamine
the justifications and proper scope of the doctrine of punitive damages. The defendant
in Tuttle had conceded liability at trial and focused solely upon the amount of
damages the jury could properly award. 2 On appeal, the defendant challenged only
the award of punitive damages, vigorously arguing for the complete abolition of
punitive damages in Maine.3 This controversial issue concerning the legal justifiabil-
ity of punitive damages arose from the following, unfortunately vague,4 facts.
The plaintiff, Hattie Tuttle, was seriously injured when a Lincoln-Continental
driven by the defendant, Ralph Raymond III, struck the Plymouth in which she was
a passenger with such force that the Plymouth was sheared in half. According to the
court, the jury was presented with sufficient evidence for it to have found that Raymond
was driving at an excessive rate of speed in a twenty-five mile per hour zone when
he struck the Plymouth, and that he had driven through a red light just before the
impact. 5
1. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985).
2. Id. at 1354.
3. Id. The defendant also argued that punitive damages were inappropriate as a matter of law under the facts of
the case, and that nonetheless, several errors in the trial court required a reversal of the punitive damages award. Id.
4. See Note, Tuttle v. Raymond: Drawing The Line on Punitive Damages, 38 ME. L. REv. 635 (1986), arguing
that the court's ambiguous treatment of the facts involved in Tuttle "contributes to the confusion inherent in the meaning
given by the court to implied malice." Id. at 638 n. 19. The Note just cited criticizes the Tuttle court largely for failing
to distinguish between malice implied-in-fact and malice implied-in-law, both of which might signify a sufficiently
culpable state of mind to warrant punitive damages. Id. at 647-50. See also infra note 101.
This Comment, on the other hand, embraces the concept of reckless disregard of the circumstances as a proper basis
for awarding punitive damages, without any separate inquiry into varying degrees of implied malice. This Comment
argues that the defendant's conduct in Tuttle was probably sufficiently reprehensible to support a punitive award under
either a subjective definition of recklessness, see infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text and notes 171-74 and
accompanying text, or under an objective definition of recklessness, see infra notes 167-69, 183-92 and accompanying
text. It is, however, just as imperative under a recklessness standard as under an implied malice standard, that a court fully
analyze all of the facts involved in a particular case in order to determine the precise state of mind of the defendant. The
court's failure to fully evaluate the facts in Tuttle precludes a definitive analysis as to whether the defendant's conduct
would satisfy a subjective definition of recklessness. Nonetheless, this Comment argues that certain aspects of Raymond's
conduct indicate that it may be considered to have satisfied a subjective definition of recklessness. See infra notes 171-74
and accompanying text.
5. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1354 (Me. 1985). The plaintiff in Tuttle also specifically alleged that
Raymond had been going ninety miles per hour in a twenty-five mile per hour zone, that he had driven through two red
lights, "that he had passed a car already stopped at the first light, and that he had failed to swerve or brake as he ran the
second and hit the plaintiff." Note, supra note 4, at 638 (citing Brief of Appellee at 1, 14, Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d
1353 (Me. 1985)). The court, however, failed to address these contentions in its opinion.
In addition, the court's opinion does not indicate whether there was any evidence presented regarding the defendant's
possible intoxication at the time of the accident. The effect of evidence of driving while intoxicated upon the availability
of punitive damages is discussed infra notes 132-45 and accompanying text.
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Based upon these facts, the trial court awarded $50,000 in compensatory and
$22,000 in punitive damages. 6 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
refused to abolish the doctrine of punitive damages, but did vacate the punitive award
in this particular case. 7 In doing so, the court announced a new standard which
severely restricts the availability of punitive damages in motor vehicle tort cases.8
The new standard permits the imposition of punitive damages based upon tortious
conduct only when the defendant acted with malice. 9
The malice requirement can be satisfied by a showing of "express" or "actual"
malice in which the defendant's conduct is motivated by ill will towards the plaintiff,
or alternatively, when the defendant's conduct is "so outrageous that malice can be
implied."' 0 Significantly, the court emphasized that the latter implied or legal malice
"will not be established by the defendant's mere reckless disregard of the circum-
stances."l
Before addressing the propriety of this restrictive punitive damages standard, this
Comment will briefly examine the historical origins of punitive damages.' 2 Since
punitive damages have been subjected to scathing criticisms from the time of their
inception, a discussion of the continuing policy debate regarding theirjustifiability also
will be presented.' 3 Then, the Comment will shift to a discussion of the different legal
standards which have been utilized to support punitive awards, 14 and of particular types
of conduct in operating motor vehicles which courts often have held to be sufficiently
culpable to justify the imposition of punitive damages.'s The primary focus of the
Comment, however, is to evaluate the express holding in Tuttle that implied malice
"will not be established by the defendant's mere reckless disregard of the circum-
stances,"' 6 and thus, that a punitive damages award will not be supported under a
reckless disregard of safety standard. Rather than focusing upon Maine law, under
6. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1354 (Me. 1985).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1361.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. In addition, the court held that future plaintiffs must prove malice by clear and convincing evidence in order
to recover punitive damages. Id. at 1354 & n.2, 1362-63. This heightened standard of proof has been adopted by other
courts as well. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1967); Traveler's Indemnity
Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 360-63 (Ind. 1982); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 298-300, 294
N.W.2d 437, 457-58 (1980). For a discussion of the propriety of the court's raising the standard of proof in Tuttle, see
Note, supra note 4, at 653-57.
12. See infra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 32-96 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 110-45 and accompanying text.
16. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me. 1985). Several issues concerning the availability of punitive
damages, including whether one can insure against the assessment of punitive damages, were not raised in the Tuttle case,
and thus were reserved for future consideration. Id. at 1360 n.20.
For a thorough treatment of the insurability issue, see I J. GuaIARI & J. KuzcuRe, PuNmvE DxsiAGEs L. & Pasc. § 6.11
(1985 & Supp. 1986); Schumaier & McKinsey, The Insurability of Punitive Damages, 72 A.B.A. J. 68(4) (March 1.
1986); Note, The Publicly Held Corporation and the Insurability of Punitive Damages, 53 Foan.,wt L. REv. 1383 (1985);
Note, Corporate Insurability of Punitive Damages Arising from Employee Acts, 11 J. Cok,. LAw 99 (1985); Comment,
Insurance Against Punitive Damages in Drunk Driving Cases, 69 MARQ. L. Rev. 306 (1986); Case Comment, Punitive
Damages Insurance: Why Some Courts Take the Smart Out of Smart Money, 40 U. Mt ,,u L. Rev. 979 (1986); Annot.,
16 A.L.R.4th 11 (1982).
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which Tuttle arose, this Comment will address the more general question of whether
reckless operation of an automobile is a type of conduct for which the law should
impose punitive damages.' 7
11. THE CONTROVERSIAL HISTORY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Historical Origins
Two major theories have been advanced to explain the origin of punitive
damages in the common law system. The first theory asserts that the doctrine arose
from judicial reluctance to set aside jury verdicts awarding excessive damages.' 8 This
reluctance was predicated upon the jury's original position as both investigator and
adjudicator of disputes.' 9 Under this scheme, jurors were chosen because of their
familiarity with the litigants and the facts in dispute. 20 Thus, courts generally deferred
to the more knowledgeable juries and declined to review jury determinations of
damages. 21
By the end of the eighteenth century, however, courts had developed standards
to measure damages in contract 22 and tort actions involving property damage.3
While the standard eventually adopted for personal injury cases allowed recovery
only for compensatory purposes, 24 courts remained reluctant to set aside jury awards
when the defendant's conduct had been particularly outrageous. 25 These courts
17. See infra notes 146-96 and accompanying text.
18. DUrrY, PtNm'E DAmAoEs: A Docnum Wmnt SuouwD BE AousEmD 4 (DEF. REsEAR CH INsr. Monograph: The Case
Against Punitive Damages, 1969); Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a PrincipledApproach, 31 HAsms L.
J. 639, 642-43 (1980).
19. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 643.
20. Id.; DUFFy, supra note 18, at 4.
21. See, e.g., Townsend v. Hughes, 2 Mod. 150, 150-51, 86 Eng. Rep. 994, 994-95 (1649) (action of scandalum
magnatum against the defendant for saying that the plaintiff "is an unworthy man, and acts against law and reason" in
which the Chief Justice affirmed an award of four thousand pounds damages stating, "that as a Judge he could not tell
what value to set upon the honour of the plaintiff; the jury have given four thousand pounds, and therefore he could neither
lessen the sum or grant a new trial, especially since by the law the jury are judges of the damages: and it would be very
inconvenient to examine upon what account they gave their verdict .... "); Russel v. Palmer, 2 Wils. K.B. 325, 328,
95 Eng. Rep. 837, 839 (1767) (action for negligence against an attorney in which the court stated, "whereas this action
[s]ounds merely in damages, and the jury ought to have been left at liberty to find what damages they thought fit."). See
also C. McCo.mAcX, LAw oF DA-tAcs 24-25 (1935); T. SErascxA, MEASURE oF DAMAGES § 349 at 688 (9th ed. 1912).
22. See, e.g., Sharpe v. Brice, 96 Eng. Rep. 557, 557 (C.P. 1774) (stating that "Ilin contract the measure of
damages is generally [a) matter of account, and the damages given may be demonstrated to be right or wrong.").
23. See, e.g., Pleydell v. Earl of Dorchester, 101 Eng. Rep. 1115, 1115 (K.B. 1798) (action for property damage
incurred as a result of diverting the plaintiff's water-course, in which the court set aside a verdict awarding £3000 damages
because "not warranted by the evidence: it being a mere question of property as stated on the record, where there was
something whereby to measure the damages, namely, the deterioration of the property itself; and therefore not like cases
of personal injuries, as actions for adultery, slander, &C."). See also Dotty, supra note 18, at 5.
24. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Sutton, 53 111. 397, 399-400 (1870) (stating that "[tihe law is well settled,
where the injury is not willful, mental suffering forms no part of the inquiry by a jury . . . the only inquiry for the jury
was, the bodily injury, and such consequential damages as were the necessary result of the injury."); Flemington v.
Smithers, 2 C&P 292, 292-93 (K.B. 1826) (holding that plaintiff father, in action to recover for loss of son's services
as driver of a stage coach, could recover damages for value of the lost services, but not for injury to his parental feelings).
25. See, e.g., Earl v. Tupper, 45 Vt. 275, 276, 288 (1873) (affirming award of "exemplary damages" because the
defendant's series of assaults upon a pregnant woman which led to her death constituted "malice or wantonness.");
Tullidge v. Wade, 3 Wils. K.B. 18, 19, 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (1769) (plaintiff's daughter raped in his home; court affirmed
"liberal damages" because the plaintiff "received this insult in his own house."); Benson v. Frederick, 3 Burr. 1845,
97 Eng. Rep. 1130 (K.B. 1766) (recognizing the power to set aside excessive damage awards, but affirming such an
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articulated the theory that these additional damages were permitted when the
defendant's conduct had been motivated by malice or ill will towards the plaintiff.26
The second theory asserts that punitive damages were designed to compensate
the plaintiff for intangible harms27 such as emotional distress and pain and suffering
which were otherwise non-compensable at early common law. 28 During the nine-
teenth century, though, courts in both the United States29 and England 30 began to
expand the concept of actual damages to include intangible harm. Thus, the original
compensatory function of punitive damages came to be satisfied by actual damages,
and the vast majority of modem courts and legislatures have spoken of punitive
damages primarily in terms of punishment and deterrence. 31
B. The Continuing Policy Debate Regarding the Justifiability of Punitive
Damages in the United States
Punitive damages have been the subject of many exacting criticisms 32 since they
were adopted as part of the common law in this country by a large majority of the
award in this case because the defendant's wrongful flogging of the plaintiff "scandalized and disgraced" him); Huckle
v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 205, 207, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768-69 (1763) (affirming award of "exemplary damages" in case
in which the plaintiff was taken from his house by virtue of a general warrant and detained for six hours in order to procure
evidence against an underground newspaper).
26. See cases cited supra note 25. The first case in which punitive damages were expressly named as a separate
category of damages was Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763). Lord Camden expressed this
recognition in the following extract:
[Tihe personal injury done to [the plaintiff] was very small, so that if the jury had been confined by their
oath . . . .perhaps £20 damages would have been thought damages sufficient; but the small injury done to the
plaintiff. . . did not appear to the jury in that striking light in which the great point of law touching the liberty
of the subject appeared to them at the trial . . . . [I] think they have done right in giving exemplary damages.
To enter a man's house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish
Inquisition; a law under which no Englishman would wish to live an hour;, it was a most daring public attack
made upon the liberty of the subject.
Id. at 206-07, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768-69.
27. See DursY, supra note 18, at 5; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 643.
28. See cases cited supra note 24. See also Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1872), for a lengthy discussion of early
cases awarding exemplary damages and the conclusion that they all may be viewed as properly considering aggravating
circumstances for the sole purpose of fully compensating the plaintiff, id. at 353; Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 66
Tex. 580, 587, 18 S.W. 351, 354 (1886) (discussing and rejecting the traditional view that damages were allowed only
for those items of loss "as were susceptible of having attached to them an exact pecuniary value, [- the dollars and cents
lost as the result of a breach of contract or tort.").
A corollary to this theory proposes that punitive damages are a means of compensating the plaintiff for other legally
non-compensable elements of damage such as attorney's fees. See, e.g., Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 154
Conn. 116, 127, 222 A.2d 220, 225 (1966) (stating that in Connecticut, "[r]ecovery is limited to an amount which will
serve to compensate the plaintiff to the extent of his expenses of litigation less taxable costs.").
29. See, e.g., Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 26 (1889) ("The action is for an injury to the person of an
intelligent being; and when the injury, whether caused by wilfulness or by negligence, produces mental as well as bodily
anguish and suffering, independently of any extraneous consideration or cause, it is impossible to exclude the mental
suffering in estimating the extent of the personal injury for which compensation is to be awarded."); Canning v.
Inhabitants of Williamstown, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 451,452 (1848) (where "the injury to the person is of such a character,
as to be necessarily attended with mental suffering, such suffering is, within the meaning of the statute, a part of the injury
to the person, and may be considered in the estimate of damages."). See also Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts, 70 HARv. L. REv. 517, 520 n.28 (1957).
30. See, e.g., Andrews v. Askey, 8 Car. & P. 7, 173 Eng. Rep. 376 (C.P. 1837) (allowing damages for mother's
distress and anxiety of mind in action for seduction of daughter).
31. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 34-37, 47-49, 61-65, and 72 and accompanying text.
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states. 33 A primary criticism has been that punitive damages simply do not serve the
compensatory purpose for which they were originally created. 34 Since actual damages
now encompass items such as mental pain and suffering and wounded feelings, 35 it
is argued that "[tihe doctrine of [punitive damages] is an anachronism and should be
abolished.' '36 In effect, since the plaintiff is now fully compensated by compensatory
damages, any amount of punitive damages constitutes an unjustified windfall to the
plaintiff.37
This argument, however, "fails to account for the fact that many legal doctrines
serve purposes that differ from those for which they originally were developed. ' 38
The fourteenth amendment, for example, originally was intended to protect former
slaves, but its meaning has been broadened considerably to protect, for example, the
rights of large public corporations. 39 "So long as a doctrine continues to serve a
necessary policy goal, the fact that it has diverged from its original function does not
provide a basis for abolishing the doctrine. The pertinent question is whether punitive
damages continue to serve a rational policy.' 40 The fact remains, however, that the
compensated plaintiff who is awarded punitive damages does indeed receive a
windfall (and often a very large windfall). Given the overriding compensatory goal
of tort law, it is quite reasonable to ask "why, if the tort feasor is to be punished by
exemplary damages, they should go to the compensated sufferer, and not to the public
in whose behalf he is punished." 41
Although very compelling, this proposal is subject to the counterargument that
requiring punitive damages awards to be contributed to a public fund would destroy
the efficacy of punitive damages as an incentive to the plaintiff to bring a lawsuit and
thereby vindicate society's outrage at the defendant's conduct, which might otherwise
33. Only four jurisdictions either totally or partially prohibit the imposition of punitive damages. See McCoy v.
Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 175 La. 487,498, 143 So. 383, 385-86, cert. denied, 287 U.S. 661 (1932) (punitive damages
disallowed unless specifically authorized by statute); City of Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass.
257, 269, 47 N.E.2d 265, 272 (1943) (punitive damages disallowed unless specifically authorized by statute); Abel v.
Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 930, 104 N.W.2d 684, 688 (1960) (punitive damages never allowed); Spokane Truck & Dray
Co. v. Hoofer, 2 Wash. 45, 51-54, 25 P. 1072, 1073-74 (1891) (punitive damages never proper, "The plaintiff is made
entirely whole [by liberal compensatory damages] .... Surely the public can have no interest in exacting the pound of
flesh."). See generally 1 J. GtHmin & J. KciRex, supra note 16, at §§ 4.09-.12 (1985 & Supp. 1986), in which the
authors discuss further the limited role of punitive damages in each of these states.
In addition to these four states, one might also consider that the states of Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan, and New
Hampshire do not allow punitive damages in the usual sense of the word given the compensatory approach taken towards
punitive damages in those states. Id. at § 4.07 n.2. See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
34. See Murphey v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541,545-46, 5 P. 119, 122 (1872); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 349 (1872);
Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 654, 672 (1877) (Ryan, C.J., dissenting). See also Doens, supra note 18, at
8; Ghiardi, The Case Against Punitive Damages, 8 FORtrM 411, 412-13 (1972-73).
35. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
36. DtrrF, supra note 18, at 8. See also Ghiardi, supra note 34, at 412-13, 423-24; Long, Punitive Damages: An
Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAx L. Rsv. 870, 888 (1975-76).
37. See DurFv, supra note 18, at 8; Long, supra note 36, at 886.
38. Malor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 644.
39. See, e.g., First National Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (holding that corporation's
proposed publication of views in opposition to a graduated personal income tax was "at the heart of the First
Amendment's protection," made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment).
40. Mailor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 644. See infra notes 77-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
traditionally recognized purposes of punitive damages.
41. Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 654, 672 (1877) (Ryan, C.J., dissenting).
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go unpunished. 42 Similarly, the possibility of a punitive damages award may
encourage the plaintiff to prefer legal action over violent self-help remedies. 43 In
order to serve these goals and at the same time prevent the plaintiff from obtaining
a massive windfall, it might be desirable to require that a certain percentage of a
punitive damages award be contributed to a public fund, while allowing the plaintiff
to retain the rest. 44
A second major attack upon punitive damages rests upon the traditionally
distinct functions of the civil and the criminal law. The purpose of a criminal
proceeding is to protect and vindicate the interests of society as a whole, by punishing
the offender through incarceration, by rehabilitating the offender so that he will not
repeat the offense, and by deterring the offender and others from engaging in similar
conduct. 45 The purpose of a civil action for a tort, on the other hand, is to compensate
the plaintiff for injuries sustained. 46 Some commentators argue that retribution and
protection of society through deterrence are goals better left to the criminal law with
its attendant procedural safeguards. 47 Punitive damages, it is argued, are primarily
penal in nature and cannot constitutionally be imposed in the absence of the
procedural safeguards afforded the defendant in a criminal prosecution. 48
Although this argument seems fairly compelling, 49 the "bright line that [it]
42. Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1158, 1162 (1966). See also infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Note, The Vitality of the Doctrine of Punitive Damages in Maine, 35 ME. L. REv, 447, 458 (1983)
(suggesting that the legislature could require either that plaintiff split award with state according to prescribed ratio, or
that plaintiff be allowed to retain from award any amount necessary to cover expenses not fully covered by compensatory
award, with any remainder to go to the state).
A recent Iowa statute requires a plaintiff to contribute any amount in excess of 25% of a punitive damages award to
the state in situations in which the defendant's conduct was not directed specifically at the plaintiff or at the person from
whom the plaintiff's claim is derived. IowA CODE ANN. § 668A. 1 (West Supp. 1987). Under this statute, the amounts paid
to the state are paid into a civil reparations fund to be used for the purposes of "indigent civil litigation programs or
insurance assistance programs." Id. In cases involving malice directed specifically at the person from whom the plaintiff's
claim is derived, the statute does not require any contribution to the state civil reparations fund.
45. See generally J. HAmL, GERAI. PRINCIPLES or CRMINAL AW (2d ed. 1960); W. LAFAvE & A. Scott, CmuNAL LAw
ch. 1, § 1.5, at 22-29 (2d ed. 1986); 1 VARrO's CMuNAL LAw & PRoC. 1-9 (1957); Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law,
23 LAw & CormEp. PRoas. 401 (1958).
46. See generally W. PRossuR & W. KEE-roi, ToRts § 2, at 7 (5th ed. 1984); P. %VFmema, THE LAW OF Toxrs, chs.
1, 3, 8 (1931); Hall, Interrelation of Criminal Law and Torts, 43 COLNi. L. Rev. 753, 756-60 (1943).
47. See, e.g., FORD, THE CONsrmONArr'v OF PuNmvE DMAGES 15 (DEr. REsEARcH INsT. Monograph: The Case
Against Punitive Damages, 1969); Ghiardi, supra note 34, at 418-19; Long supra note 36, at 889.
48. FORD, supra note 47, at 17-18; Ghiardi, supra note 34, at 418-19; Long, supra note 36, at 889. These
procedural safeguards include the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to counsel, the
privilege against self-incrimination, and the prohibition against double jeopardy. See Note, Criminal Safeguards and the
Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. Ci. L. REv. 408 (1966-67) for an excellent refutation of these constitutional
challenges against punitive damages. The author concludes that significant differences exist between criminal punishment
and punitive damages which justify fewer procedural safeguards in the civil arena. The concern with double jeopardy is
discussed infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
49. In fact, the United States Supreme Court once stated that a civil proceeding may operate in substance and effect
as a criminal proceeding and held that the fourth and fifth amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and
seizures and compulsory self-incrimination were applicable in a proceeding to establish a forfeiture of goods alleged to
have been imported without paying duties thereon. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-35 (1886). In United States
v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896), however, the Court held that the Boyd principle had no bearing on the possible extension
to civil proceedings of sixth amendment rights to be confronted with witnesses. And in United States v. Regan, 232 U.S.
37 (1914), the Court refused to raise the burden of proof to beyond a reasonable doubt in a civil action to recover a
pecuniary penalty.
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attempts to interpose between the civil and the criminal law is in fact artificial.' '5 In
an early treatise on the law of damages, Sedgwick advocated punishment by civil
courts in certain situations. 51 He stated that:
Where either of these elements [fraud, malice, gross negligence, or oppression] mingle
in the controversy, the law, instead of adhering to the system, or even the language of
compensation, adopts a wholly different rule. It permits the jury to give what it terms
punitory, vindictive, or exemplary damages; in other words, blends together the interest of
society and of the aggrieved individual, and gives damages not only to recompense the
sufferer but to punish the offender.5 2
In addition, the United States Supreme Court, relying on more than a century of
precedent, observed that, "[b]y the common as well as by statute law, men are often
punished for aggravated misconduct or lawless acts, by means of a civil action, and
the damages, inflicted by way of a penalty or punishment, given to the party
injured. "53
There are many instances in which punitive damages serve a valid purpose as
either a supplement to, or a substitute for, the criminal law.5 4 Punitive damages, for
example, may serve as an effective supplement to the criminal law when the criminal
punishment is a fine and the defendant is wealthy. 55 In such a case, punitive damages
may provide greater deterrence than a fine, especially when the maximum fine is
miniscule compared to the wealth of the defendant. 56 In addition, punitive damages
may provide a supplemental deterrent effect in situations in which "practices such as
plea bargaining ... water down the deterrent effect of the criminal law.' '57
Moreover, when the defendant's conduct is rarely or never prosecuted, punitive
damages may constitute the only effective regulation of conduct.58 This is particularly
true in cases involving libel and slander, trespass, and technical batteries. 59 In these
50. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Me. 1985). Similarly, Professor Morris has concluded that:
[als long as the liability with fault rules are retained, the law of torts will have an admonitory function even
though the doctrine of punitive damages is abandoned. So[,l punishment in tort actions is not anomalous (if
anomalous only means unusual); and punitive damage practice is only one of many means of varying the size
of money judgments in view of the admonitory function.
Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HAsv. L. REv. 1173, 1177 (1931).
51. T. SmGoicx, A TR.,,rsE oNThE MMEAsuRE or DmAGEs 53 (7th ed. 1880).
52, Id.
53. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Me. 1985), citing Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371
(1851).
54. See generally Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 655-58; Note, supra note 42, at 1173-76.
55. Note, supra note 42, at 1174.
56. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965), aff'd, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), in which
the plaintiff in a libel action, arguing that the district judge was far more lenient to the defendant in reducing the award
(to $400,000) than was justified, said:
The jury in the case at bar recognized that a 100 million dollar corporation with a circulation of between six and
seven million copies and a readership of approximately 22,000,000 persons can be deterred by no less than three
million dollars as a charge for its misuse of a cherished American freedom-the freedom of every man to live
unthreatened by calumny.
Id. at 719 n.47. See also Note, supra note 42, at 1175.
57. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 657.
58. See id.; Morris, supra note 50, at 1196; Note, supra note 42, at 1175.
59. Punishment in these areas is usually left to the law of punitive damages. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965), aff'd, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (libel action); Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 135
N.W.2d 789 (1965) (assault and battery); General Fin. Corp. v. Sexton, 155 So. 2d 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (action
for conversion).
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situations, punitive damages act as a complete substitute for the criminal law rather
than as a supplement. 60 The use of punitive damages to supplement, or even to
supplant, the criminal law may be entirely justified when one considers the
reprehensibility of much conduct that is not effectively regulated by the criminal law.
We should either attempt to deter such conduct by the threat of punitive damages, or
at least express societal disapproval by punishing the defendant through the
imposition of punitive damages.
On the other hand, "[t]he policy attack on punitive damages is most persuasive
when the conduct for which punitive damages are imposed is also punishable as a
crime" and "the criminal system is adequately performing the functions of
punishment and deterrence."61 The possibility of confinement and the stigma of a
criminal record usually provide a far greater punishment and a more effective
deterrent than the imposition of punitive damages. 62
Critics of punitive damages argue that to expose defendants to both criminal and
civil penalties for the same conduct contravenes the spirit, though not the letter, 63 of
the fifth amendment prohibition of double jeopardy. 64 The Indiana courts tradition-
ally relied upon this argument and held that the mere possibility of a criminal
prosecution bars an action for punitive damages based upon the same conduct. 65
60. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 656; Note, supra note 42, at 1175.
61. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 655.
62. Note, supra note 42, at 1173-74.
63. Read literally, the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment applies only to an "offense," which has been
interpreted as referring solely to criminal offenses. See Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874); United States v.
Bollinger, 290 F. 395 (E.D.N.Y. 1923); Commonwealth ex reL. Garland v. Ashe, 344 Pa. 407, 26 A.2d 190 (1942). The
United States Supreme Court, however, has more recently held that the double jeopardy prohibition applies to proceedings
that are "essentially criminal." Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975). In determining that juvenile proceedings are
"essentially criminal," the Breed Court examined the purpose of the proceeding, the potential consequences, and the
extent to which the action is brought and backed by the resources of the state. Id. at 529. In a recent case applying the
Breed criteria, the Fifth Circuit ruled that punitive damages awarded in a private civil action are not part of a proceeding
which is "essentially criminal." Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1042 (5th Cir. 1984).
64. See, e.g., FoRD, supra note 47, at 17-22; Ghiardi, supra note 34, at 418-19; Note, supra note 42, at 1181-84.
65. Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322 (1854). In reversing a punitive award in a civil action for assault and battery, the
Taber court explained its rationale in the following manner
Where the defendant is sued for the commission of a tort, such as slander, an offence not the subject of
criminal punishment, the rule that gives damages 'to punish the offender,' may, with some degree of propriety,
be applied, because it is the only mode in which, by public example, the various rights in community to personal
security and private property can, under the sanction of law, be protected from injury and outrage. In such a
case, there is wisdom in permitting a jury to 'blend together the interest of society and of the aggrieved
individual.'
But there is a class of offences, the commission of which, in addition to the civil remedy allowed the
injured party, subjects the offender to a state prosecution. To this class the case under consideration belongs;
and if the principle of the instruction be correct, Taber may be twice punished for the same assault and battery.
This would not accord with the spirit of our institutions. The constitution declares, that 'no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offence;' and though that provision may not relate to the remedies secured by civil
proceedings, still it serves to illustrate a fundamental principle inculcated by every well-regulated system of
government, viz., that each violation of the law should be certainly followed by one appropriate punishment and
no more.
Id. at 325.
In the 1970s, long after the Taber decision, the Indiana courts of appeal began to disagree as to whether any
exceptions to the Taber rule had been or should be created. In Nicholson's Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Schramm, 164
Ind. App. 598, 330 N.E.2d 785 (1975), the First District Court of Appeals noted that three exceptions to the Taber rule
had been developed. The court stated that despite the traditional prohibition, the Indiana courts would allow punitive
damages: (I) when the defendant's conduct indicated a heedless disregard of the consequences; (2) when the statute of
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This argument, however, has never been very successful outside of Indiana. 66
Courts which have fully considered the double jeopardy argument have rejected it on
one of two grounds. 67 The first ground is that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment and similar state provisions apply only to an "offense" which refers
solely to criminal offenses.68 Under this literal approach, it is clear that an individual
may be criminally prosecuted and later subjected to punitive damages in a civil action
based upon the same conduct.
The second ground for rejecting the double jeopardy argument is based upon the
analysis that criminal punishment is imposed as a result of a wrong done to the public,
while the imposition of punitive damages in a civil action is based upon a violation
of individual interests. 69 In effect, this argument asserts that the traditional Indiana
rule "ignores the social judgment that one kind of conduct may be both a public and
a private wrong and that a single punishment may not be sufficient to punish and
deter.' '70 Under this rationale, a court may allow the imposition of punitive damages
limitations on the criminal charge had run; and (3) when, in an action against a corporation, the corporation could not be
criminally prosecuted for the acts of its agents. Id. at 606, 330 N.E.2d at 791 (citations omitted).
Subsequently, in Glissman v. Rutt, 175 Ind. App. 493, 372 N.E.2d 1188 (1978), the Third District Court of Appeals
severely criticized Schramm, stating that: "An examination of the cases cited for the 'heedless disregard' exception does
not support the Schramm conclusion. Indeed, in none does it appear that the bar arising from potential or past criminal
prosecution was raised by the defendant." Id. at 495, 372 N.E.2d at 1190. The court in Glissman found itself to be bound
by the Taber rule and affirmed the trial court's denial of punitive damages sought in connection with an automobile
accident for which the defendant had already been convicted and sentenced for the offense of reckless driving.
Nonetheless, the court noted that the reasons behind the Taber rule had not been scrutinized since 1893 and it strongly
encouraged the Indiana Supreme Court or the state legislature to do so. Id. at 497, 372 N.E.2d at 1191.
The Indiana legislature responded with the enactment of IND. CODE AnN. § 34-4-30-2 (West Supp. 1986), effective
on September 1, 1984. This statute effectively reverses the Taber rule by stating that "[ilt is not a defense to an action
for punitive damages that the defendant is subject to criminal prosecution for the act or omission that gave rise to the civil
action .... " Id. The statute does, however, expressly prohibit the recovery of beth punitive damages and treble
damages for injuries to property which may be sought under IND. CODE AsN. § 34-4-30-1 (West Supp. 1986). IN. CODE
As. § 34-4-30-2 (1) (2) (West Supp. 1986). A property damage plaintiff evidently may obtain one or the other, but may
not obtain both punitive damages and the statutory treble damages. For a discussion of this Indiana statute, see Note,
Punitive Damages for Crime Victims: New Possibilities for Recovery in Indiana, 18 IND. L. REv. 655 (1985). For a
comprehensive review of the origin and development of the traditional Taber rule prior to the enactment of the 1984
statute, see Aldridge, The Indiana Doctrine of Exemplary Damages and Double Jeopardy, 20 IND. L.J. 123 (1945), and
Note, Double Jeopardy and the Rule Against Punitive Damages ofTaber v. Hutson, 13 IND. L. REv. 999 (1980).
66. See 1 J. Gmisni &J. KescHEs, supra note 16, § 3.02, at 2, in which the authors state that "[a]n overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions allow the imposition of punitive damages in a civil action even though the same wrongful conduct
of the defendant may subject him to criminal punishment." The authors cite cases from 31 jurisdictions in support of this
broad proposition, id., § 3.02, at 5-6 n.3, but note that "[m]ost of those jurisdictions have either failed to address the
double jeopardy argument or, if they have done so, have merely relied on 'the great weight of authority' to support their
rulings following the majority." Id., § 3.02, at 2.
67. Id.
68. See E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 42 Colo. App. 497,498-99, 596 P.2d 413, 414-15 (1979); Svejcara
v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 741, 487 P.2d 167, 169 (1971); Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 28748 (1878), cited in
I J. GHnnI & J. KmaiE, supra note 16, § 3.02, at 6 n.5. See also supra note 63 for a discussion of the fifth amendment
meaning of "offense."
69. See Hauser v. Griffith, 102 Iowa 215, 218, 71 N.W. 223, 223 (1897); Doehoefer v. Shewmaker, 123 Ky. 646,
655-59, 97 S.W. 7, 9-11 (1908); Elliot v. Van Buren, 33 Mich. 49, 56-57 (1875); Morris v. McNab, 25 N.J. 271,
281-82, 135 A.2d 657, 662-63 (1957).
70. Note, supra note 48, at 415. See also I J. GHJ ADi & J. KijcHER, supra note 16, § 3.02, at 3, stating that
"[ulnder this approach, a violation of the double jeopardy prohibition is not found when a person subject to criminal
sanction is also punished by punitive damages since both the public and the person injured by the wrongful act are
furnished with distinct and concurrent remedies."
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as a double punishment, but only when the criminal penalty is not sufficient to
achieve the goals of punishment and deterrence. 71
Punitive damages also have been assailed because of a lack of clear standards by
which the jury can assess the proper amount of damages. 72 Many courts, however, do
require that the amount of punitive damages bear some reasonable proportion to the
plaintiff's actual, compensatory damages. 73 Moreover, the same lack of clear
standards argument can be asserted against compensatory awards for intangible harms
for which recovery is clearly allowed under American law. 74 In addition, punitive
damages are subject to both reduction by the trial court under the doctrine of
remittitur and to appellate review; the jury's discretion is never completely
unsupervised. 75 Perhaps more importantly, the flexibility given to the jury in
assessing punitive damages is desirable in that it allows an individualized punishment
that is commensurate with the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct and with
the defendant's wealth. 76
In sum, although the criticisms of punitive damages deserve serious consider-
ation, they do not warrant the complete abolition of the doctrine. Punitive damages
are available in an overwhelming majority of states77 because they continue to serve
several useful purposes.
Punitive damages have been justified as serving at least four distinct purposes:
compensating the tort victim, appeasing both the victim's and society's possible
desire for revenge, punishing the defendant, and deterring both the defendant and
others from engaging in similar conduct in the future. 78 Only four states expressly
recognize the compensatory function of punitive damages as the primary function of
the doctrine. 79 The Connecticut Supreme Court, for example, has stated that the
71. This approach is advocated by several commentators. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 658; Morris,
supra note 50, at 1195; Note, supra note 29, at 524; Note, supra note 48, at 415.
72. DuFry, supra note 18, at 8; Note, supra note 48, at 419.
73. 2 J. Gai.&n & J. KIRcHER, supra note 16, § 18.06, at 19-22. This reasonable relationship test, however, is of
little utility because of its vague parameters. See id., discussing cases in which ratios of 11: 1, 15:1, and 40:1 have been
found not to be excessive. Generally, once the question of punitive damages has been submitted to the jury, the court will
pay great deferrence to the jury's determination of damages because the jury is seen as the sole judge of the amount that
is necessary to punish and deter. See id. at § 18.04.
74. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 646. See also supra note 29 and accompanying text.
75. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 646; Note, supra note 42, at 1171-72. On the doctrine of remittitur, see
generally 2 J. GIARDI & J. KIRcHnR, supra note 16, ch. 18.
76. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 646-47; Note, supra note 42, at 1170; Note, supra note 29, at 528.
77. See supra note 33.
78. Note, supra note 29, at 520.
79. These four states are Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan, and New Hampshire. See Waterbury Petroleum Prod.,
Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., 193 Conn. 208, 235, 238,477 A.2d 988, 1003, 1004 (1984) (rejecting plaintiff's proposal
that Connecticut abandon its compensatory approach to punitive damages and "join the majority of jurisdictions which
permit an amount of 'punitive' damages which serves to 'punish and deter' wrongdoers who act wantonly and recklessly,"
in order to fully compensate a plaintiff for his injuries (including litigation expenses) and yet "[avoid] the potential for
injustice which may result from the exercise of unfettered discretion by a jury."); Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 233,
190 N.W. 746, 747 (1922) (punitive damages "may enlarge the compensatory allowance, but they are not to be
considered as authorizing a separate sum by way of example or punishment."); Vratsenes v. N.H. Auto, Inc., 112 N.H.
71, 72, 289 A.2d 66, 67 (1972) (noting that the punitive function of exemplary damages has been rejected in New
Hampshire, but that in cases involving "wanton, malicious, or oppressive" acts, "the compensatory damages for the
resulting actual material loss can be increased to compensate for the vexation and distress caused the plaintiff .... ").
New Hampshire has since adopted an even more restrictive position with the enactment of N.H. REv. STAT. AiN. § 507.16
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purpose of punitive damages is "not to punish the defendant for his offense[,] but to
compensate the plaintiff for his injuries, and [the] so-called punitive or exemplary
damages cannot exceed the amount of the plaintiff's expenses of litigation, less
taxable costs." 80 More recently, the Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed and
reaffirmed its "compensatory" punitive damages rule, stating that:
In permitting awards of punitive damages, but limiting such damages as we do, our rule
strikes a balance-it provides for the payment of a victim's costs of litigation, which would
be otherwise unavailable to him, while establishing a clear reference to guide the jury fairly
in arriving at the amount of the award. 8'
The Michigan Supreme Court has taken a somewhat different compensatory view by
recognizing punitive damages as being in the nature of compensation for
embarrassment and injured feelings. 82 New Hampshire also adheres to this latter
view, 83 which is actually a recognition of the English concept of "aggravated"
damages. 4
Even in those states which do not recognize the compensatory element of
punitive damages as the primary function of the doctrine, elements of compensation
such as attorney's fees can be identified in punitive damages awards. 85 Thus,
although the original compensatory function of punitive damages has largely been
fulfilled by an expanded definition of actual damages,8 6 the compensatory element is
still directly prevalent in four states and indirectly present in several others.
Injured plaintiffs may seek punitive damages in part because of a desire for
revenge. 87 By ensuring that a plaintiff can afford financially to pursue a remedy, the
doctrine of punitive damages "encourages plaintiffs to prefer legal action over violent
self-help." 88 Although "[a] modem legal system can hardly be based on
revenge, . . . [insofar] as self-help is discouraged by satisfying a plaintiff's vindic-
tive spirit a useful purpose is served by awarding exemplary damages." 89
(1986), which provides that "[n]o punitive damages shall be awarded in any action, unless otherwise provided by
statute."
The status of punitive damages in Georgia is rather confusing because of the interplay between three separate sections
of the Georgia Code governing civil damages and a lack of clarity among the courts that have applied those statutes. See
I J. Gmn~wi & J. KmcHER, supra note 16, at § 4.04 for a good discussion of Georgia's approach to punitive damages,
which the authors classify as being primarily compensatory in nature. Id. at § 4.02.
80. Doroska v. Lavine, Ill Conn. 575, 578, 150 A. 692, 692-93 (1930).
81. Waterbury Petroleum Prod., Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., 193 Conn. 208, 237, 477 A.2d 988, 1004 (1984).
82. Willett v. Ford Motor Co., 400 Mich. 65, 71, 253 N.W.2d 11, 113 (1977).
83. See Vratsenes v. N.H. Auto, Inc., 112 N.H. 71, 72, 289 A.2d 66, 67 (1972), discussed supra note 79.
84. 1 J. GwAsDs & J. KmacuR, supra note 16, § 4.07, at 8.
85. See, e.g., New Orleans, J. & G.N.R.R. v. Allbritton, 38 Miss. 242, 272-73 (1859) (holding that in cases for
exemplary damages, counsel fees may be taken into consideration); New York, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Grodek, 127 Ohio
St. 22, 24-25, 186 N.E. 733, 734 (1933) (holding that compensation for services of plaintiff's attorney may be recovered
only when the wrong complained of involved elements of fraud, malice, or wantonness which would authorize a punitive
award).
86. See cases cited supra note 29.
87. Note, supra note 29, at 522. Two early decisions, Merest v. Harvey, 5 Taunt. 442, 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P.
1814) and Grey v. Grant, 2 Wils. K.B. 252, 95 Eng. Rep. 794 (C.P. 1764), explicitly acknowledged that one purpose
of large damages awards was to prevent dueling.
88. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 650.
89. Note, supra note 29, at 522.
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Punitive damages also constitute a type of public revenge by reflecting society's
outrage at the defendant's conduct in the form of a verdict awarding such damages. 9°
In this context, punitive damages give an incentive to the plaintiff to serve as a
"private attorney general" and bring to "justice" a wrongdoer whose misconduct
might otherwise go unpunished. 91
A vast majority of jurisdictions justify the imposition of punitive damages as
serving the dual functions of punishment and deterrence. 92 In an opinion represen-
tative of this majority position, the Iowa Supreme Court stated that:
[T]hey [punitive damages] are awarded under proper circumstances and conditions as
a punishment for the particular party involved and as a warning and an example to him in
the future, and to all others who may offend in like manner .... The opinions of this Court
have always emphasized the thought that the purpose of exemplary damages was the
punishment, and prevention of similar future offenses.93
Indeed, it has even been argued that punitive damages must be recognized as serving
the functions of both punishment and deterrence because the two cannot logically be
separated. 94 Basing punitive damages solely on a desire to punish, it is argued, would
be "irrational" because "it seeks to inflict present suffering to 'remedy' past injuries
that cannot be undone.' '95 Inflicting punishment for past acts, however, tends to
control future conduct in that the defendant and others will seek to avoid the
consequences of such acts in the future.96 With these justifications for punitive
damages in mind, the focus of this Comment will now shift to a discussion of the
different legal standards which have been utilized to support punitive awards, and of
particular types of conduct in operating motor vehicles which courts often have held
to be sufficiently culpable to justify punitive damages awards.
III. CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING THE RECOVERY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Generally
Punitive damages differ significantly from compensatory damages in that
exemplary damages deliberately focus attention upon the character of the defendant's
conduct rather than upon the extent of harm suffered by the plaintiff.97 In general:
[s]omething more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive
damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or
"malice," or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious
90. Id.; see also Long, supra note 36, at 877-78; Comment, Punitive Damages: An AppealforDeterrence, 61 NEa.
L. REv. 651, 654 (1982).
91. Long, supra note 36, at 877-78; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 649-50; Comment, supra note 90, at 654.
92. Cases and statutes from 36 states are cited in I J. GHURD1 & J. KIRCHE, supra note 16, at § 4.14 n.1 (1985 &
Supp. 1986) in support of this broad statement.
93. Sebastian v. wood, 246 Iowa 94, 100, 66 N.W.2d 841, 844-45 (1954).
94. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 648.
95. Id.
96. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 648.
97. 1 J. GmARD & J. Kmciim, supra note 16, at § 5.01.
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and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or
wanton. 98
Simply stated, ordinary negligent conduct is not sufficiently culpable to justify the
sanction of civil punishment. 99 The sanction of punitive damages should be reserved
for situations in which the defendant's state of mind "transforms conduct from the
understandable to the intolerable.... The closer a defendant's state of mind comes
to a subjective perception of the risk of harm to another, the more likely it becomes
that punitive damages will be awarded."to
Thus, to justify the imposition of punitive damages, a defendant's conduct
generally need not be motivated by a conscious objective to harm the plaintiff. Such
a conscious objective to harm, or actual malice toward the plaintiff, would however,
most easily justify an award of punitive damages.10 1 The difficulty arises in
determining when the defendant's state of mind is sufficiently close to a subjective
perception of the risk of harm to others to warrant punitive damages. 1o2 Courts and
legislatures have employed a wide variety of terms, including gross negligence,'0 3
98. W. PRossER & W. Kim.oN, ToRTs § 2, at 9-10 (5th ed. 1984).
99. See Greyhound Corp. v. Townsend, 234 Miss. 839, 846-47, 108 So. 2d 208, 210 (1959); Spackman v. Ralph
M. Parsons Co., 147 Mont. 500, 510-11,414 P.2d 918, 923-24 (1966); Sheffield Division Arnco Steel Corp. v. Jones,
376 S.W.2d 825, 829 (Tex. 1964); Wright v. Everett, 197 Va. 608, 612-15, 90 S.E.2d 855, 858-60 (1956) (punitive
damages not awarded solely on basis of gross negligence). See also Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 651.
100. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 651 (emphasis added).
101. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me. 1985). It should be made clear that the actual malice standard
requires an inquiry into the state of mind of the defendant, and usually a finding of express ill will towards the plaintiff.
In some jurisdictions, however, actual malice may be evidenced by conduct other than express ill will. See, e.g., Detling
v. Chockley, 70 Ohio St. 2d 134, 137-38, 436 N.E.2d 208, 210-11 (1982) ("[Alctual malice may take . . . the form
of reckless, willful or wanton behavior which can be inferred from surrounding circumstances"); Glidden v. Skinner, 142
Vt. 644, 647, 458 A.2d 1142, 1144 (1983) (actual malice sometimes may be shown by "'reckless or wanton disregard
of one's rights' ") (quoting Shortle v. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 137 Vt. 32, 33, 399 A.2d 517, 518 (1979)).
Implied malice, on the other hand, is a more imprecise concept with judicial interpretations of the phrase ranging
"from mere reckless disregard of the rights of others, to wanton or willful disregard of the rights of others, to actual malice
implied by the evidence adduced at trial." Note, supra note 4, at 647 (footnote omitted). While the Tuttle court used the
terms "implied malice" and "legal malice" interchangeably, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me. 1985), it has been argued that
a better evaluation of the egregiousness of Raymond's conduct could be made by recognizing implied malice as malice
implied-in-fact and legal malice as malice implied-in-law. Note, supra note 4, at 647-48. The former "is nothing more
than actual malice inferred from circumstantial evidence," while malice implied-in-law is a distinct legal concept referring
to "deliberately wrongful behavior possessing some additional element of outrageousness or flagrancy so as to be
considered morally equivalent to malicious conduct and therefore deserving of similar treatment." Id. at 648.
102. See infra notes 157-74 and accompanying text.
103. Some courts have listed "gross negligence" as a possible ground for a punitive damages award, but usually
only in combination with other words denoting aggravated culpability. See, e.g., Gandall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 787,
537 P.2d 65, 67 (1975) (quoting Unfried v. Libert, 20 Idaho 708, 728-29, 119 P. 885, 891 (1911) ("[where] the action
of the wrongdoer is wanton, malicious or gross and outrageous, or where the facts are such as to imply malice and
oppression . . . [or where the facts] show willful malice, fraud, or gross negligence.")); Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v.
Batchelor, 266 Ind. 310, 314, 362 N.E.2d 845, 847 (1977) (quoting Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599,
609, 349 N.E.2d 173, 180 (1976) (" 'whenever the elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence or oppression mingle in
the controversy."') (emphasis supplied by the court in Hibschman).
Conversely, other courts have explicitly declared that mere "gross negligence" is not enough to support a recovery
of punitive damages. See Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129, 133, 36 A.2d 699, 701 (1944); Wright v. Everett, 197 Va. 608,
612-15, 90 S.E.2d 855, 858-60 (1956). Likewise, W.L. Prosser has said that gross negligence is "a term of ill-defined
content" which should not be used to justify punitive damages awards. W. PossER & W. KE.Eros, ToRTs § 2, at 10 (5th
ed. 1984).
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willful and wanton misconduct, 10 4 malice, 1 0 5 and reckless disregard for the rights or
safety of others, 10 6 in order to justify punitive damages awards. 10 7 While there has
been much disagreement over the meaning of these terms,108 they all stand for
essentially the same basic, unscientific proposition: that the defendant's conduct was
sufficiently outrageous to warrant punitive damages. 109
The next section will discuss motor vehicle tort cases in which a particular type
of conduct has or has not been held to satisfy the various standards for imposing
punitive damages. It may be somewhat artificial to divide automobile accident cases
into categories based upon a particular type of conduct because the cases often
104, Several states have included willful and wanton misconduct as part of their definitions of conduct justifying
exemplary awards. See, e.g., Cloroben Chemical Corp. v. Comegys, 464 A.2d 887, 892 (Del. 1983) (citing Riegel v.
Aastad, 272 A.2d 715, 718 (Del. 1970) (when the defendant's wrongful act was committed wilfully and wantonly));
Enright v. Lubow, 202 N.J. Super. 58, 76, 493 A.2d 1288, 1297-98 (1985) (quoting LaBruno v. Lawrence, 64 N.J.
Super. 570, 575, 166 A.2d 822, 824 (1960), cert. denied, 34 N.J. 323, 168 A.2d 694 (1961) ("actual malice, which is
nothing more or less than intentional wrongdoing-an evil-minded act; or . . .an act accompanied by a wanton and
willful disregard of the rights of another.")); Petsch v. Florom, 538 P.2d 1011, 1013 (Wyo. 1975) ("the act of the
defendant was committed maliciously, willfully or wantonly."); IowA CoDe ANm. § 668A.1 (Vest 1987) ("willful and
wanton disregard for the rights or safety of another.").
105. Both actual and implied malice, see supra note 101, have been cited as proper grounds for punitive damages
awards in the following cases and statutes: Columbus Finance, Inc. v. Howard, 42 Ohio St. 2d 178, 183-84, 327 N.E.2d
654, 658 (1975) ("punitive damages may be awarded in tort cases involving fraud, insult or malice" with "intentional,
reckless, wanton, wilful and gross acts" being relevant to the extent that "actual malice may be inferred from conduct
and surrounding circumstances."); Mor. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1985) ("where the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed."); NEv. Ray. STAT. § 42.010 (1986) ("where the defendant has been
guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, express or implied."); S.D. Comrno LAws Am-. § 21-3-2 (1967 & Supp. 1986)
("where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed.").
The statutes just cited all contain peculiarities and special limitations regarding the availability of punitive damages.
They should be consulted individually for a more precise delineation of the punitive damages standard in each particular
state.
106. Courts have cited reckless disregard or indifference to the rights or safety of others as a justification for punitive
damages in the following cases: Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. O'Kelley, 645 P.2d 767, 774 (Alaska 1982) (quoting
Bridges v. Alaska Housing Authority, 375 P.2d 696, 702 (Alaska 1962)) (where conduct is "outrageous, such as acts
done with malice or bad motives or [a] reckless indifference to the interests of another, to extent that reckless indifference
indicates malice, express or implied) (emphasis added); Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 112, 229
S.E.2d 297, 301 (1976) (quoting Baker v. Winslow 184 N.C. 1, 110 S.E. 570 (1922)) ("fraud, malice, such a degree
of negligence as indicates a reckless indifference to consequences, oppression, insult, rudeness, caprice, wilfulness.")
(emphasis added); Jordan v. Sauve, 219 Va. 448,452, 247 S.E.2d 739, 741 (1978) (quoting Giant of Virginia v. Pigg,
207 Va. 679, 685-86, 152 S.E.2d 271, 277 (1967)) ("where there is misconduct or actual malice, or such recklessness
or negligence as to evince a conscious disregard of the rights of others;" but only to the extent that the recklessness
indicates actual malice) (emphasis added); Jeffers v. Nysse, 98 Wis. 2d 543, 548, 297 N.W.2d 495, 497 (1980) (quoting
Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 79, 135 N.W.2d 789, 797 (1965)) ("a showing of wanton, wilful, or reckless disregard
of the plaintiff's rights.") (emphasis added).
107. See I J. Gm&Ror & J. Kiscues, supra note 16, at § 5.01 for a complete listing of the various standards used by
courts and legislatures to justify punitive damages awards.
108. See, e.g., Nichols v. Texas Electric Serv. Co., 206 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (citing cases that
define gross negligence as an entire want of care which would raise a presumption of a conscious indifference to
consequences). Cf. Bailey v. Smith, 132 S.C. 212, 225, 128 S.E. 423, 428 (1925) (defining gross negligence as conduct
such that "a person of ordinary prudence and reason would say that it constituted a reckless disregard of the rights of
others."). See generally Roberson, Exemplary Damages for Negligence: A Definitional Analysis, 33 BAY!oR L. Rav. 619
(1981); Note, supra note 42, at 1164-65.
109. See, e.g., Hull v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 76 S.C. 278, 57 S.E. 28 (1907) (stating that "[elach of the words
'wantonness,' 'wilifulness,' and 'recklessness' embodies the element of malice, either express or implied, and [they) are
in law substantially the equivalent of each other, [insofar] as they give rise to an action based upon punitive damages.").
See also Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. Rsv. 1, 35 (1983) (in which the
author states that: "Terms such as 'wilful,' 'wanton,' 'conscious indifference,' 'reckless disregard,' and 'recklessness'
are overlapping and to a substantial extent redundant. Accordingly, they will be referred to collectively as the recklessness
group."). Cf. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 652, concluding that "to the extent that (these terms] indicate that the
defendant had or should have had a subjective perception of the risks involved, punitive damages are properly awarded."
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involve a combination of several types of conduct which might warrant the imposition
of punitive damages. Nonetheless, the courts in the following cases awarded punitive
damages based primarily upon a particular type of conduct.
B. Excessive Speed As a Basis of Recovery
Several courts have awarded punitive damages when the charge of misconduct
was based primarily upon the speed at which the defendant drove. 110 In Shirley v.
Shirley," ' for example, the plaintiff had to establish that the defendant's conduct was
accompanied by wantonness in order to recover punitive damages under a state
wrongful death stafute. 112 The court found that the plaintiff had satisfied this standard
by introducing evidence that the defendant was traveling at a speed of 75-100 miles
per hour into a curve when he lost control and went off the road." 3 Similarly, in
Claunch v. Bennet,' 4 in which the defendant was racing within the city limits at
speeds reaching ninety miles per hour, eventually colliding with the plaintiff's car,
the court held that his conduct was so grossly negligent as to justify an award of
punitive damages. " 5 Another example of sufficiently outrageous conduct occurred in
Morgan v. Bates, 16 in which the defendant, after promising the plaintiff passenger
that he would drive carefully, drove his car at ninety miles per hour while trying to
pass a second car on a curve. 117 After the defendant lost control of the car, it rolled
over five or six times, seriously injuring the plaintiff." 8 The court held that this
conduct supported an exemplary award of $1,000.119 It is significant that in each of
these cases upholding awards of punitive damages based on excessive speed, the
courts recognized as a proper basis for imposing punitive damages, some sort of
misconduct which is less culpable than a subjective intent to harm the plaintiff,
because (as in most motor vehicle tort cases) there was no evidence of actual malice.
Other courts, however, have expressed a general reluctance to permit an award
of punitive damages based primarily on excessive speed. In Missouri Pacific
Transportation Co. v. O'Neal, 20 there was evidence that the defendant was operating
a bus "at an excessive or dangerous rate of speed"' 12' on a gravel highway, causing
several passengers to become extremely nervous and frightened, and eventually
causing the plaintiff's injuries when the driver lost control and went into a ditch.' 2
Nonetheless, the court held, without any explanation, that the claim for punitive
110. See generally Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 813, § 3, at 821-22 (1958).
!11. 261 Ala. 100, 73 So. 2d 77 (1954).
112. Id. at 109, 73 So. 2d at 85 (1954).
113. Id. at 106, 73 So. 2d at 82 (1954).
114. 395 S,W.2d 719 (rex. Civ. App. 1965).
115. Id. at 724.
116. 390 P.2d 486 (Okla. 1964).
117. Id. at 488.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 487-88.
120. 105 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1939).
121. Id. at 627.
122. Id. at 626-27.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:551
damages was properly kept from the jury.1 23 In Brock v. Waldron,1 24 a wrongful
death action, the plaintiff sought a reversal of the trial court's finding of no reckless
misconduct by providing evidence of "speed so great that the decedent's body was
hurled one hundred and twenty feet through the air."'' 2 5 The court refused to disturb
the trial court's findings, stating that the evidence fell far short of a claim of reckless
misconduct. 126 The only change the court felt justified in making was the addition of
a finding that physical facts as well as the plaintiff's testimony were "offered to
prove that the car was going fast."' 127 The court, however, stated that the plaintiff's
reliance on excessive speed depended entirely on "doubtful physical facts," and that
the plaintiff's own testimony as to speed was entitled to little weight. 128 Ultimately,
the court held that even if the issue of reckless misconduct had been submitted to the
jury, it could not reasonably have found "other than a high degree of negligence." 29
In these cases involving excessive speed, liability for punitive damages
generally turned upon the factual inquiry as to whether the actor knew or had reason
to know of facts which created an unreasonable risk of harm "under the circum-
stances."' 130 Under this test, courts are likely to permit punitive damages awards
based on excessive speed when, for example, the speeding occurred on particularly
dangerous roads or during treacherous weather conditions and no special, exigent
circumstances existed at the time which made the speeding reasonable. Likewise,
courts generally will deny punitive damages when exceptional circumstances do
make it reasonable to travel at a high rate of speed.13 '
123. Id. at 628. This conclusory holding seems strange in light of the fairly egregious conduct of the defendant. An
award of punitive damages in a fact situation such as this arguably would promote the traditional functions of punitive
damages. See supra notes 78-96 and accompanying text.
124. 127 Conn. 79, 14 A.2d 713 (1940).
125. Id. at 81, 14 A.2d at 714.
126. Id., 14 A.2d at 714.
127. Id., 14 A.2d at 714.
128. Id. at 84, 14 A.2d at 715.
129. Id., 14 A.2d at 715.
130. RsATEmNrr (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 500 comment a (1965) (emphasis added). See infra text accompanying note
169 for text of § 500.
131. See, e.g., Reilly v. City of Philadelphia, 328 Pa. 563, 569, 195 A. 897, 900 (1938) (holding that police
officer's high rate of speed during chase of a fleeing felon was in the performance of an official emergency duty and not
a reckless disregard for the safety of others. Cf. Cavey v. City of Bethlehem, 331 Pa. 556, 560, 1 A.2d 653, 655 (1938)
(holding that motorcycle policeman's high speed chase of speeding sedan into a busy intersection was not in the
performance of an emergency duty and constituted a reckless disregard for the safety of others).
Although the issue in these cases was not whether punitive damages could be recovered (rather, the issue was whether
the plaintiff had proven the reckless disregard necessary to recover any damages from the city under a Pennsylvania
statute), the cases clearly indicate that the concept of recklessness depends upon the reasonableness of the actor's conduct
under the circumstances. Compare REsTmtErMr (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 500 comment a, which provides in part, that:
While under ordinary circumstances it would be reckless to drive through heavy traffic at a high rate of speed,
it may not even be negligent to do so if the driver is escaping from a bandit or carrying a desparately wounded
man to the hospital for immediately necessary treatment, or if his car has been commandeered by the police for
the pursuit of a fleeing felon ....
If an accident occurs in a more typical situation, reckless misconduct often will support an award of punitive
damages. See supra note 106 and infra note 176. But, if the speed at which a defendant drove is found to have been
reasonable in a particular set of circumstances, and thus not even negligent, much less reckless, it is unlikely that punitive
damages would be permitted under a reckless disregard standard in a case primarily based upon allegations of excessive
speed.
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C. Evidence of Intoxication As a Basis of Recovery
Another type of conduct which often will support a punitive damages award in
motor vehicle tort cases is driving while intoxicated. Although this section is not
intended to be an exhaustive discussion of the effect of intoxication upon the
availability of punitive damages, 32 a brief summary is warranted here because of the
frequency and seriousness of these cases. The cases basically fit into three groups in
determining the effect of intoxication when assessing punitive damages.
Many courts have held that evidence of driving while intoxicated, in itself,
comports with their definitions of conduct which justifies an award of punitive
damages. 133 Generally, these courts express grave concerns about the extreme risks
involved in operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and a
desire to deter such conduct by all possible means. In Taylor v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles, 134 for example, the California Supreme Court stated that:
[O]ne who wilfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that
he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and
mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to
exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. 35
In expressing a desire to deter drunken driving, the court quoted the following
sentence from Harrell v. Ames:136
[T]he fact of common knowledge that the drinking driver is the cause of so many of the more
serious automobile accidents is strong evidence in itself to support the need for all possible
means of deterring persons from driving automobiles after drinking, including exposure to
awards of punitive damages in the event of accidents. 37
132. For a thorough treatment of this topic, see Kotler, Imposing Punitive Damage Liability on the Intoxicated
Driver, 18 AKso. L. REv. 255 (1984); Note, Punitive Damages in California: The Drunken Driver, 36 HAsrm-Gs L.J. 793
(1985); Note, Punitive Damages and the Intoxicated Driver: An Approach to Taylor v. Superior Court, 31 HAsINGs L.J.
307 (1979); Comment, Punitive Damages and the Drunken Driver, 8 PEPPEanwi L. REv. 117 (1980-81); Note, Punitive
Damages in Drunk-Driving Cases: A Call for a Strict Standard and Legislative Action, 19 SurF-oi U.L. REv. 607 (1985).
See generally 1 J. GH~nwi & J. KuzcHEu, supra note 16, at § 5.03; Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 656 (1975).
133. See, e.g., Taylor v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979)
(voluntary consumption of alcoholic beverages to point of intoxication when the individual knows from the outset that he
must thereafter operate a motor vehicle demonstrates a conscious disregard of the safety of others and may constitute
malice sufficient to justify award of punitive damages); Infeld v. Sullivan, 151 Conn. 506, 509, 199 A.2d 693, 695 (1964)
(characterizing driving while under the influence coupled with fleeing the scene of an accident as "wanton misconduct");
Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 107-OS, 66 N.W.2d 841, 848 (1954) (evidence that defendant was very intoxicated
indicated a "wilful disregard of the plaintiff's rights and therefore legal malice," justifying the allowance of punitive
damages); Hawkinson v. Geyer, 352 N.W.2d 784, 788-89 (Minn. App. 1984) (drinking to point of extreme intoxication
with knowledge that car would be driven later that day sufficient to submit punitive damages claim before jury based on
"willful indifference to the rights or safety of others"); Colligan v. Fer, 76 Misc. 2d 22, 24-25, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306, 309
(1973) (drunken driving equated with the necessary "gross, wilful, and wanton negligence" and labeled "morally
culpable"); Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, 40, 268 A.2d 157, 160 (1970) (equating drunken driving with the
necessary "outrageous conduct . . . [done with] reckless indifference to the interests of others"). See generally 1 J.
GH ARD & J. KRCHER, supra note 16, § 5.03, at 15-16; Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 656, § 3, at 661-64 (1975 & Supp. 1986).
134. 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979).
135. Id. at 897, 598 P.2d at 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
136. 265 Ore. 183, 508 P.2d 211 (1973).
137. 24 Cal. 3d 890, 897, 598 P.2d 854, 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 697 (1979) (quoting Harrell v. Ames, 265 Ore.
183, 190, 508 P.2d 211, 214-15 (1973)) (emphasis added by court).
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Other courts have expressed the view that evidence of driving while intoxicated
must be accompanied by a separate showing of malice to support an award of punitive
damages.1 38 In Giddings v. Zellan,139 for example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that proof of drunken driving did not
constitute proof of malice, fraud, or evil intent which was required for an award of
punitive damages under Maryland law. The court stated that "[i]n automobile
negligence cases the Maryland court obviously is of opinion that criminal statutes are
a better deterrent than civil penalties."' 140 The Ohio Supreme Court, in Deting v.
Chockley,' 41 expressed a similar reluctance to base an award of punitive damages
solely upon evidence of intoxication, but for a different reason. The court reasoned
as follows:
Allowance of punitive damages simply because a defendant was intoxicated at the time of
an accident, without establishing causation and without demonstrating intention, or delib-
eration through, at the least, aggravating circumstances, virtually would impose strict liability
for intoxication in negligence actions. This would not be in concert with our well-developed
jurisprudence of punitive damages, and we see no persuasive reason for taking such a step. 42
Finally, scant authority can be found for the proposition that intoxication may
eliminate the mental element necessary for an award of punitive damages. 143 This
view, in effect, regards intoxication as possibly eliminating the defendant's ability to
consciously choose a course of action either with knowledge of the serious risk of
harm to others or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to a
reasonable person. 44 This reluctance to infer the necessary mens rea from the
conduct of an intoxicated defendant has been criticized as "quite odd in light of the
massive public education in this country on the serious dangers of intoxicated driving
and in light of auto accident statistics on the relationship of intoxicated driving to
property damage, personal injury and death on our highways."' 45
The following section will address the specific question of whether reckless
disregard of the circumstances in a motor vehicle tort situation should justify the
138. See, e.g., Giddings v. Zellan, 160 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 759 (1947) (holding that proof
of drunken driving did not equal proof of malice, fraud, or evil intent, as required for punitive damages under Maryland
law); Detling v. Chockley, 70 Ohio St. 2d 134, 436 N.E.2d 208 (1982) (holding that evidence of intoxication alone was
insufficient to raise a jury question on punitive damages because a showing of intention or deliberation through, at the
least, aggravating circumstances, was required); Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 905, 114 S.E.2d 617 (1960) (holding that
drunken driving may be negligent, wrong, reckless, and unlawful, but that it was not necessarily a malicious act which
had to be proven to recover punitive damages). See generally 1 J. Gnwwiu & J. KiRCHE, supra note 16, § 5.03, at 16-17;
Annot. 65 A.L.R.3d 656, § 4, at 664-66.
139. 160 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 759 (1947).
140. Id. at 587.
141. 70 Ohio St. 2d 134, 436 N.E.2d 208 (1982).
142. Id. at 139-40, 436 N.E.2d at 212 (1982).
143. 1 J. GHIAiDI & J. KmciEs, supra note 16, § 5.03, at 17.
144. Id. (citing Russell v. Elkins, 115 Ohio App. 341, 177 N.E.2d 355 (1961) (evidence of intoxication in and of
itself not sufficient to constitute wanton misconduct because the evidence failed to show that defendant's decedent was
conscious of the fact that his conduct would probably result in injury)).
This view was squarely rejected by the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors in Infeld v. Sullivan, 159 Conn. 506,
509, 199 A.2d 693, 695 (1964) ("An operator may well be in this [intoxicated] condition and, at the same time, be able
to exercise the conscious choice which is a requisite of wanton misconduct.").
145. 1 J. GQARDI & J. Ksuui, supra note 16, § 5.03, at 17. The statistics referred to in this quotation indicated that
drinking was a causal factor in at least one-half of the fatal motor vehicle accidents in 1977. Id. at § 5.03, at 18 n.l1.
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imposition of punitive damages. Particular emphasis will be placed upon evaluating
the holding of the Tuttle court which answered this question in the negative.
IV. SHOULD RECKLESS DISREGARD OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES BE CONSIDERED
SUFFICIENTLY CULPABLE CONDUCT TO JUSTIFY THE IMPOSITION
OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES?
In Tuttle v. Raymond, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the malice
necessary to assess punitive damages "will not be established by the defendant's
mere reckless disregard of the circumstances." 146 The court acknowledged that other
jurisdictions would support a punitive damages award under a reckless disregard
standard, 47 but it purported to "adopt a narrower view in order to reduce the
vagueness and uncertainty surrounding the concept of implied malice in this
context." 148 The court sought to reject punitive damages standards under which "the
stated goal of deterring reprehensible conduct would be furthered only marginally or
not at all."' 149 Specifically, the court rejected a reckless disregard of the circum-
stances standard because it "overextends the availability of punitive damages, and
dulls the potentially keen edge of the doctrine as an effective deterrent of truly
reprehensible conduct." 50
The court's restrictive approach, however, is underinclusive because it excludes
a large class of misconduct which is "truly reprehensible conduct" that might be
deterred by the threat of punitive damages. The court simply characterized
Raymond's conduct as "reckless operation of an automobile," and summarily
concluded that the punitive damages award should be vacated because the deterrent
function would not be served in the absence of malice. 1' 5 This conclusion is suspect
because of the court's failure to carefully analyze each aspect of the defendant's
conduct, and then make a determination as to whether any degree of deterrence might
be achieved by affirming the punitive damages award. Moreover, the Tuttle opinion
is largely unsupported by judicial authority. A vast majority of jurisdictions would
permit a punitive damages award in a situation such as that involved in Tuttle. 152
Finally, the decision is likely to cause even more confusion in this area of the law of
damages because of the vague implied malice standard set forth by the court. 153 In
short, the Tuttle opinion constitutes an excessive limitation upon the doctrine of
punitive damages in situations in which the doctrine traditionally has been justified as
serving the functions of compensating tort Victims, 154 appeasing both the victim's and
146. 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me. 1985).
147. Id. at 1361-62.
148. Id. at 1362.
149. Id. at 1360.
150. Id. at 1361.
151. Id. at 1362.
152. See infra notes 175-85 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 183-98 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
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society's possible desire for revenge, 5 5 and the complementary functions of
punishment and deterrence.156
First of all, the court failed to justify adequately its conclusion that the
deterrence function of punitive damages cannot be served when they are awarded
based upon a reckless disregard standard. Several aspects of the defendant's conduct
arguably were sufficiently culpable to justify a punitive damages award in furtherance
of the goal of deterrence.
Recall that the defendant in Tuttle was traveling fast enough to shear in half the
Plymouth in which the plaintiff was a passenger. He had also gone through a red light
immediately prior to the accident. 157 This conduct is sufficiently outrageous to
warrant the imposition of punitive damages because the defendant's state of mind
probably approached, in certain respects, 58 a subjective realization of a substantial
risk to the safety of others. Moreover, even if Raymond did not subjectively realize
the substantial risk of harm to others created by his conduct, he will be held, under
section 500 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, to have possessed the knowledge
of risk of harm that a reasonable person in the circumstances would have had. 59 This
objective type of recklessness, as well as subjective recklessness, is considered
sufficiently culpable to justify a punitive damages award under the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. 6o Simply stated, the defendant's conduct (whether subjectively
reckless or objectively reckless) was flagrant and "[a]s the defendant's misconduct
becomes more flagrant, the need to deter such conduct increases."161
A thorough analysis of the culpability of Raymond's misconduct can be made
through the use of an analytical spectrum of misconduct, under which the goal of
deterrence will or will not be achieved depending on the state of mind of the
defendant. More specifically, at one end of the spectrum lie acts of passion such as
assault and battery. Deterrence is least likely to be achieved in these situations
because often the defendant simply does not think at all before acting. 162 At the
opposite end of the spectrum lie intentional acts such as fraud. In these situations,
deterrence is probably the most effective because the defendant must make a
conscious and deliberate choice to commit the act.163 If the defendant realizes the
potential for having to pay a large punitive damages award, he or she is more likely
to refrain from committing the intentional act.
The concept of reckless conduct lies somewhere between these two extremes.
The probable effectiveness of punitive damages as a deterrent to reckless conduct
depends on whether recklessness is defined objectively or subjectively. If reckless-
155. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
157. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1354 (Me. 1985).
158. See infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
159. REsTATmENr (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 500 (1965). See infra text accompanying note 169 for text of § 500.
160. REsrATmErT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 908 & comment b (1965). See also infra notes 183-92 and accompanying text.
161. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 667.
162. Note, supra note 42, at 1162 n.31 (citing Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401,406, 179 N.E.2d 497,499,223
N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (1961) for the converse proposition that punitive damages are most likely to achieve their desired
deterrent effect when imposed against a wrongdoer who engages in a systematic scheme to defraud the general public).
163. See supra note 162.
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ness is defined subjectively, as in the Model Penal Code,' 64 the defendant must
consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm for his conduct to
be considered reckless. 165 Under this definition of recklessness, the defendant's
conduct approaches that of an intentional act and punitive damages are more likely to
achieve deterrence.166
On the other hand, if recklessness is defined objectively as in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 16 7 the defendant must have acted1 68 "knowing or having reason to
know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize ... that his conduct
creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, [and] that such risk is
substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent." 169
Under this definition, the defendant may not have actually realized that his conduct
created a substantial risk of harm to others, but rather, the law imposes upon him the
knowledge of risk of harm that a reasonable person in the circumstances would have
had. In this situation, deterrence is less likely to be achieved because the defendant
personally may not have realized the risk of harm that he or she had created, and thus
probably would not have considered any potential liability for punitive damages
before engaging in the dangerous act.' 70
Considering that the defendant in Tuttle was traveling fast enough to shear in
half the Plymouth in which the plaintiff was a passenger, and that he had just driven
through a red light immediately prior to the accident, 171 the defendant's conduct may
be considered sufficiently culpable to satisfy the more stringent, subjective definition
of recklessness.1 72 Of course, under this definition, any conscious choice exercised
by Raymond refers to his choosing to drive in a dangerous manner in the face of a
164. MODEL PENA. CODE § 2.02(2)(C) (1962).
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
167. RErAmTS!F~r (SEco.D) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
168. Section 500 also includes as part of its definition of reckless disregard of safety the intentional failure to do an
act which a person knows is his duty to perform to another, knowing or having reason to know that his failure to perform
creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of harm to the other. In this regard, Raymond's failure to stop at a red light
just before the impact, see supra text accompanying note 5, may constitute reckless misconduct under § 500 if it was an
intentional failure to stop. To the extent that a defendant's conduct is characterized as reckless under § 500 of the
Restatement, it also will be considered sufficiently culpable to justify an award of punitive damages under § 908 of the
Restatement. See RsrAmsEscr (SEcoN.') OF Toms § 908 & comment b (1965). See also infra notes 183-92 and
accompanying text.
169. REStrzalr (SEco.o) OF TORTS § 500 (1965) (emphasis added).
170. It may be argued, however, that a degree of both general and special deterrence may still be achieved when
recklessness is defined in a more objective sense. See, e.g., G. WruiAtsrs, CRIuNA. LAw: THE GENERAL PART § 43, at 123
(2d ed. 1961), in which the author states:
Although the harmful result of careless driving is not intended, there is often an element in the careless driving
that is intended (e.g., pulling out on a blind comer), and the punishment, coupled with the recollection of the
circumstances of the accident, may "condition" the driver not to repeat his mistake, and may even cause him
to be more careful in other respects. Conceivably, it may also improve the conduct of others who come to know
of the mistake that was made.
171. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Me. 1985).
172. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text. Cf. Note, supra note 4, at 649-50, stating that:
S. . [lintent may refer to the conduct itself; the conduct is an intermediate fact of consequence. For example,
conduct may be intentionally wrongful or intentionally illegal. Under this definition it may have been apparent
to a jury that Raymond wrongfully intended to drive in a manne.r he knew to be both illegal and dangerous to
the public. Arguably, such intent warrants consideration of punitive damages as malice implied-in-law.
(footnotes omitted).
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substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to others; it does not refer to an intent to
harm others. 173 In this regard, Raymond's knowledge of the high rate of speed at
which he was traveling may constitute subjective recklessness if he actually knew of
the substantial risk of harm to others and consciously chose to proceed in the face of
this known danger. Moreover, if Raymond knew that he was about to travel through
a red light and he chose to disregard the substantial risk that this would create, this
aspect of his conduct might also be considered subjectively reckless. Under the
subjective view of recklessness, the defendant's conduct would approach the
culpability level of an intentional tort for which the imposition of punitive damages
is more likely to achieve the goal of deterrence.' 74 Unfortunately, the court's
summary treatment of the facts in Tuttle precludes a sound analysis as to whether the
defendant actually did consciously disregard a known risk of harm to others.
In any event, the holding in Tuttle that malice will not be implied from reckless
disregard of the circumstances, and thus, that punitive damages may not be obtained
under a reckless disregard standard, 75 is clearly contrary to the vast majority of
judicial authority. 176 The court cited only one case in support of its holding, Miller
Pipeline Corp. v. Broecker.177 In Miller Pipeline, the Indiana Court of Appeals
expressed concern that "[t]o sanction punitive damages solely upon the basis of
conduct characterized as heedless disregard of the consequences would be to allow
173. See supra note 172.
174. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text. See also supra note 172.
175. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me. 1985).
176. It is very difficult to isolate "reckless disregard of the circumstances" as the sole ground for a punitive damages
award because the phrase is often used in conjunction with other phrases denoting aggravated circumstances, see supra
notes 103-07 and accompanying text, and because reckless disregard, gross negligence, and wilful and wanton
misconduct are often used interchangeably to justify a punitive award. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
Nonetheless, the cases and statutes cited in 1 J. GHiARDi & J. KIRCHER, supra note 16, at § 5.01 indicate that 27 states
include some form of a "reckless disregard of the circumstances" standard as part of their definitions of the type of
conduct warranting an award of punitive damages. Id. (citing cases or statutes from Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
These states utilize a variety of recklessness phrases, including "reckless disregard," "reckless indifference,"
"conscious disregard," "conscious indifference," and "aggravated disregard." Thus, in some of these states, the
defendant must have known of the risk of substantial harm created by his conduct and consciously chose to disregard that
risk, while in others the defendant will be held to have possessed the knowledge of risk of harm that a reasonable person
in the circumstances would have had. It is unclear from the Tuttle opinion whether the court merely rejected the latter,
objective definition of reckless disregard as a basis for punitive damages, or whether it also rejected the subjective,
conscious disregard type of recklessness. Thus, it is impossible to compare with any degree of precision the exact number
of these states which would disagree with the Tuttle court's holding.
Despite this imprecision, insofar as the terms wanton or willful misconduct are often used as an equivalent of reckless
disregard of safety, see RasA-rMENT (SEcoso) OF ToRTS § 500, Special Note at 587 (1965), up to an additional 10 states
could be added to the list of states which conceivably would disagree with the holding in Tuttle. See 1 J. Gmmwe & J.
KIRcHER, supra note 16, at § 5.01 (citing cases or statutes from Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Texas, Wyoming, and from the District of Columbia) (utilizing "wilful or wanton misconduct"
language and often omitting "reckless disregard" language). Moreover, in an additional five states, "reckless disregard
of the circumstances" might be sufficient to justify a punitive award to the extent that the recklessness constitutes evidence
of implied malice. Id. (citing cases or statutes from Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, and South Dakota).
Regardless of the precise number of states which conceivably would disagree with Tuttle's rejection of a reckless
disregard standard, and regardless of the manner in which they would disagree, it has been observed that: "Coupled with
its denial of punitive damages under the facts of Tuttle, the court's limitation effectively removed Maine's interpretation
of implied malice from the mainstream of current practice." Note, supra note 4, at 646.
177. 460 N.E.2d 177 (Ind. App. 1984).
1987] EXCESSIVE RESTRICTION UPON PUNITIVE DAMAGES 573
virtually limitless imposition of punitive damages." 1 78 In citing Broecker, the Tuttle
court seems to have ignored the fact that Indiana courts have traditionally disfavored
punitive damages "because they are a windfall to the plaintiff' 1 79 and "allow
punishment without the safeguards of criminal procedure." 1 80 The Tuttle court
originally rejected these arguments when it decided to retain the doctrine of punitive
damages, 8 1 but, in an indirect way, embraced them when the court attempted to find
support for its strict limitation upon the availability of punitive damages.182
A vast majority of jurisdictions 83 adhere to a view similar to that expressed in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 908: "Punitive damages may be awarded
for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless
indifference to the rights of others."' 184 Comment b to section 908 then refers to
section 500 as defining the type of reckless indifference which may provide the
necessary state of mind to justify an award of punitive damages.185
The definition of reckless disregard of safety in section 500 of the Restatement
is a more precise and workable standard for imposing punitive damages than the
implied malice standard set forth in Tuttle. The Restatement definition of reckless
disregard provides that the actor must know or have reason to know of facts which
would lead a reasonable man to realize that his conduct will create an unreasonable
risk of harm to others and that such risk is substantially greater than that which is
necessary to make his conduct negligent. 86 This definition encompasses two different
types of reckless conduct: (1) conscious disregard of a known risk, and (2) situations
in which the defendant does not subjectively realize or appreciate the high degree of
risk involved, but in which the law will impose upon the defendant the knowledge of
risk of harm that a reasonable person in the circumstances would have had. 187 In the
latter situation, an objective standard is applied to the defendant whose "inability to
realize the danger may be due to his own reckless temperament, or to the abnormally
favorable results of previous conduct of the same sort.... "1188 It is sufficient that the
defendant know or have reason to know of "circumstances which would bring home
to the realization of the ordinary, reasonable man the highly dangerous character of
his conduct."' 89 This standard properly encompasses situations such as Tuttle, in
178. Id. at 185.
179. Id.
180. Id. See also supra note 65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the origin and evolution of the traditional
Indiana rule prohibiting a claim for punitive damages based upon conduct which might also be the subject of a criminal
prosecution.
181. 494 A.2d 1353, 1356-60 (Me. 1985). The court, however, did state that the jury "may consider any criminal
punishment imposed for the conduct in question as a mitigating factor on the issue of punitive damages." Id. at 1358.
182. See also Note, supra note 4, at 651-53 ("the court's reliance on . . . Miller Pipeline Corp. v. Broecker for
its conclusions may have been misplaced."). Id. at 651 (citation omitted).
183. See supra note 176.
184. RESsrATvAENT (Srco.m) oF TopRs § 908(2) (1965) (emphasis added).
185. Id. at comment b.
186. Id. at § 500.
187. RESTATE MEr (SEco-,D) oF ToRts § 500 comment a (1965).
188. Id. at comment c.
189. Id.
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which the defendant either consciously realized, 90 or should have realized,' 9' that his
conduct created an unreasonable risk of physical harm to others.t 92
In contrast, the implied malice standard for punitive damages announced by the
court in Tuttle is vague and unworkable. The court stated that, in addition to
situations of actual malice, punitive damages will be available "where deliberate
conduct by the defendant ... is so outrageous that malice ... can be implied."' 93
The court, however, never defined this conduct. It merely stated that reckless
disregard of the circumstances will not establish implied malice.19 4 The reckless
disregard standard has been regarded as an adequately stringent basis for possible
imprisonment in cases involving vehicular homocide, 95 so "there appears to be no
valid reason for deeming it too liberal for imposing civil sanctions." 196 The lack of
any definition for implied malice in Tuttle, on the other hand, will lead to arbitrary
decisions as to what conduct is "so outrageous" as to imply malice and justify an
award of punitive damages.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine unduly restricted the availability of
punitive damages in Tuttle v. Raymond. The doctrine of punitive damages continues
to serve the functions of compensating tort victims, appeasing both the victim's and
society's possible desire for revenge, punishing the defendant, and deterring both the
defendant and others from engaging in similar conduct in the future.197 The court
announced a standard that will be very difficult to apply and which will deny punitive
damages in cases in which they would properly serve these functions.
190. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
191. Even if Raymond did not subjectively realize the unacceptable degree of risk of harm to others which his
conduct created, supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text, several factors gave Raymond "reason to know of facts
which would lead a reasonable man to realize" that his conduct created an unreasonable and substantial risk of harm to
others, as contemplated by § 500 of the Restatement (Second).
For example, although Raymond may not have subjectively realized that he was about to drive through a red light,
the excessive speed at which he was driving gave him "reason to know" that a red light might suddenly appear and of
the danger that he would create by driving through it. Similarly, the mere fact of driving at a high rate of speed in a
populated, 25 mile per hour zone also would lead a reasonable man to realize the substantial risk of harm to others given
the likelihood that pedestrians and other vehicles would be in the area. Section 500 will not insulate the defendant from
a finding of reckless disregard merely because he did not personally appreciate the substantial risk of harm to others
created by his conduct.
192. Compare Note, supra note 4, at 653, which argues that:
If Raymond had failed to appreciate the nature and severity of the risk he had created, even though substantial,
and even though he should have been aware of the risk, his behavior would not warrant punitive damages. The
Law Court correctly removed this class of conduct from the scope of punitive damages.
193. 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me. 1985) (emphasis added).
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., State v. Chekmizoff, 82 Ariz. 176, 179, 309 P.2d 796, 798 (1957) (citing RrsrAmem-ir oF ToRs §
500 (1934) for the definition of reckless conduct and holding that defendant could be found guilty of negligent homicide
for such conduct which included passing traffic at excessive speeds on a dark night, running a red light, and traveling on
the shoulder of the road just before crashing into a bridge abutment which resulted in the death of a passenger); State v.
Carpenter, 85 Idaho 232, 237, 378 P.2d 188, 190 (1963) (quoting RxSmrium (FrosT) or Tons § 500 (1934) in support
of a charge of negligent homicide against defendant who drove his automobile at an excessive rate of speed on left side
of highway, striking an approaching auto and killing four people).
196. Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 168, 297 A.2d 721, 732 (1972).
197. See supra notes 77-96 and accompanying text.
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Under the Tuttle standard, future jurors in Maine are likely to award punitive
damages under the guise of compensation because "[t]he theory of punitive damages
(without the name) is built into the average juror's value system." 1 98 The wiser
course is to allow juries to be straightforward and explicitly award punitive damages
for injuries caused by reckless conduct. This would facilitate appellate review and
conserve judicial resources by allowing, if necessary, remittitur, or new trials on the
punitive damages issue alone. 199
Gregory A. Williams
198. Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 216, 226 (1960). See also Note, supra
note 29, at 521 n.35, citing a Wisconsin case which "was tried three times before different juries in different counties,
twice wiih punitive damages allowed and once without; each verdict ... for the same total amount." Id. at 521. The
case referred to is Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 450 (1874) ($4,500, including both punitive and compensatory
damages), 39 Wis. 636 (1876) ($4,500 compensatory damages), 42 Wis. 654, 671-72 (1877) ($2,500 compensatory,
S2,000 punitive).
199. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 18, at 646.

